Some marital assets appreciate, some depreciate, and some bark when both spouses try to claim them. When love ends but both spouses still want the dog, Florida divorce courts are left holding the leash. In February 2026, Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal confronted this recurring dilemma in Crossen v. Feeley, a case involving divorcing spouses who each sought possession of their shared golden doodle, Tucker.[i] Although the trial court attempted to award joint custody, the appellate court reversed, holding that Florida law does not authorize courts to establish joint pet custody. Instead, companion animals remain personal property subject to equitable distribution under section 61.075 of the Florida Statutes. There is a need for a mechanism that preserves this property classification while allowing courts to account for the realities of caregiving, animal welfare, and continuity of care when determining post-dissolution possession.
The law governing companion animals in Florida dissolution proceedings stems from Bennett v. Bennett.[ii] In Bennett, the First District Court of Appeal rejected a trial court’s post-divorce visitation schedule for a dog named Roddy, ruling that animals are personal property and that courts lack authority to grant custody or visitation pertaining to chattels.[iii] The court articulated a crucial policy concern that judicial resources should not be consumed by supervising ongoing post-divorce disputes over personal property.[iv] Nevertheless, Florida jurisprudence has evolved to recognize human emotional attachments to pets.[v] In Harby v. Harby, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed that while pets must be identified as marital assets subject to equitable distribution under section 61.075, a trial court may consider a party’s sentimental interest in a pet under the statutory catch-all provision in section 61.075(1)(j).[vi] Thus, Florida courts currently permit a human’s emotional bond to influence equitable distribution, yet continue to treat the animal itself purely as an object.[vii]
Limitations of this rigid approach reemerged in Crossen v. Feeley.[viii] In Crossen, the spouses purchased Tucker for $2,500, shared caretaking responsibilities, and initially agreed to shared custody during their separation.[ix] The trial court attempted to maintain that arrangement by designating the parties equal owners.[x] The Fourth District reversed that decision, reaffirming that section 61.075 governs and that no statutory authority allows trial courts to award joint custody of a pet.[xi] The Crossen court rightly preserved judicial resources by refusing to establish indefinite court-supervised custody arrangements.[xii] However, the case highlighted how strict the law can be when both spouses have genuinely cared for and bonded with the same pet.[xiii]
This tension is further illustrated in Kraushaar v. Kraushaar, where divorcing parties litigated possession of Dario, an emotional support animal.[xiv] While both parties acknowledged that Florida treats pets as personal property under section 61.075, the Third District Court of Appeal recognized that an animal’s role in alleviating a disability could constitute special circumstances in equitable distribution.[xv]
There is great inconsistency across Florida’s courts regarding equitable distribution of pets.[xvi] Under section 741.30 of the Florida Statutes, Florida’s domestic violence injunction statute expressly authorizes courts to award petitioner exclusive care, possession, or control of an animal and specifically directs courts to evaluate threats or harm to family pets when determining domestic violence is imminent.[xvii] Similarly, section 828.12 of the Florida Statutes criminalizes animal cruelty, affirming that animals possess legally protected interests against unnecessary suffering.[xviii] Florida law thus acknowledges an animal’s welfare and vulnerability when issuing protective injunctions or enforcing criminal law, yet ignores those considerations when allocating permanent possession during a divorce.[xix]
Some legal scholars, such as Professor John DeWitt Gregory, argue that pets must remain strictly categorized as property, warning that importing child custody doctrines into pet disputes distorts family law and creates administrative chaos.[xx] Conversely, animal rights advocates often urge courts to adopt a full “best interest of the pet” standard.[xxi] Florida, however, should adopt a middle ground hybrid model.[xxii]
Under this proposed reform, Florida would classify companion animals as personal property for ownership, classification, and valuation purposes under section 61.075.[xxiii] However, the legislature should amend section 61.075 to establish a “companion animal distribution standard” directing courts to evaluate specific welfare factors when awarding post-dissolution possession.[xxiv] Relevant factors would include: (1) historical primary caregiving responsibilities; (2) veterinary and financial responsibility; (3) the animal’s established living routine; (4) emotional bonds with household members and children; (5) each party’s ability to provide suitable housing and care; and (6) history of neglect, abuse, or domestic violence.[xxv] To prevent the ongoing enforcement problems identified in Bennett and Crossen, the court would award sole post-dissolution possession to one spouse without ordering visitation or continuing jurisdiction.[xxvi]
Reforming section 61.075 preserves judicial efficiency while modernizing Florida family law. By providing courts with a defined set of factors, the reform would produce more consistent outcomes while recognizing the practical role companion animals play in family life. Florida courts can keep pets out of parental responsibility disputes without pretending they belong next to the couch and coffee table.
[i] Crossen v. Feeley, 430 So. 3d 100, 107 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2026) (finding that the trial court erred by allowing the divorced parties to be joint owners, sharing custody of their dog).
[ii] Bennett v. Bennett, 655 So. 2d 109, 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that companion animals are personal property in dissolution proceedings).
[iii] Id. at 110–11 (holding that trial courts lack authority to order post-dissolution custody or visitation schedules for personal property).
[iv] Id. (emphasizing that judicial resources must not be expended on supervising post-divorce enforcement disputes regarding personal property).
[v] Harby v. Harby, 331 So. 3d 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021) (recognizing that Florida courts should permit human emotional attachment and sentimental interests in pets to be considered in equity).
[vi] Id. at 882–23; Fla. Stat. § 61.075(1)(j) (2026) (affirming that trial courts may evaluate a party’s sentimental attachment to a pet under the catch-all factor of Florida’s equitable distribution statute).
[vii] Harby, 331 So. 3d at 823; Bennett, 655 So. 2d at 110 (illustrating how current Florida doctrine allows human sentiment to affect property division without extending legal consideration to animal welfare).
[viii] Crossen v. Feeley, 430 So. 3d 100, 107 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2026) (demonstrating the practical shortcomings of applying strict property rules to shared companion animals in recent dissolution disputes).
[ix] Id. (detailing the material acquisition, shared caretaking history, and informal separation agreement concerning a companion animal).
[x] Id. (outlining a trial court’s attempt to resolve a pet dispute by ordering equal joint ownership between former spouses).
[xi] Id. at 107–08 (invalidating an award of joint custody ownership because section 61.075 contains no statutory authorization for shared pet custody).
[xii] Id. at 107; Bennett, 655 So. 2d at 110 (confirming that enforcing sole property distribution prevents endless court supervision and post-decree litigation).
[xiii] Crossen, 430 So. 3d at 107 (highlighting the tension between fixed statutory property rules and genuine dual caregiving relationships).
[xiv] Kraushaar v. Kraushaar, 424 So. 3d 522, 523 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2025) (recognizing the issues arising in dissolution proceedings when a disputed companion animal serves as an emotional support animal).
[xv] Id. at 523–24 (explaining that an animal’s function in alleviating a disability may qualify as a special circumstance justifying individualized consideration in asset distribution).
[xvi] Fla. Stat. § 741.30(5) (2026); Fla. Stat. § 828.12(2) (2026) (analyzing statutory conflicts between Florida’s property division laws and its animal protection statutes).
[xvii] Fla. Stat. § 741.30(5)(a)(4), (8)(b)(4) (2026) (authorizing protective injunctions that grant exclusive care of animals and evaluate threats to family pets when assessing imminent domestic violence).
[xviii] Fla. Stat. § 828. 12(1)–(2) (2026) (imposing criminal penalties for animal cruelty to protect sentient animals from unnecessary pain and suffering).
[xix] Fla. Stat. § 741.30(5) (2026); Fla. Stat. § 828.12(2) (2026) (contrasting the statutory recognition of animal welfare in protective and criminal contexts with its exclusion from marriage dissolution standards).
[xx] John DeWitt Gregory, Pet Custody: Distorting Language and the Law, 44 Fam. L.Q. 35, 36–37 (2010) (arguing that companion animals must be treated strictly as personal property to prevent doctrinal confusion and administrative burdens in family courts).
[xxi] Sara Mićković , Fur-Ever Homes After Divorce: The Future of Pet Custody, 28 Animal L. Rev. 47, 55–56 (2022) (advocating for comprehensive statutory reforms requiring family courts to determine pet possession based on the best interests and well-being of the animal).
[xxii] See Gregory, supra note xx, at 60–61; see also Mićković, supra note xxi, at 60–61 (urging a balanced statutory framework that integrates animal welfare factors into equitable distribution without creating ongoing custody jurisdiction).
[xxiii] Fla. Stat. § 61.075(6)(a)(V) (2026) (maintaining the baseline property classification under section 61.075 to ensure clear asset valuation and initial ownership determinations).
[xxiv] Id. (amending section 61.075 to establish mandatory statutory criteria for evaluating companion animal welfare during equitable distribution).
[xxv] Id. (enumerating specific caretaking, financial, environmental, and safety factors to guide judicial determinations of post-dissolution animal placement).
[xxvi] Bennett, 655 So. 2d at 110–11; Crossen, 430 So. 3d at 107 (requiring final awards of sole post-dissolution possession to avoid recurring enforcement disputes and ongoing judicial oversight).
