In the intricate legal tapestry of Florida, the 2008 case of C.E.L. v. State[i] stands out, focusing on a critical question: what happens when someone runs from the police? This scenario unfolds in areas labeled as both high and low in crime, raising legal questions. The case, in effect, differentiates the consequences of unprovoked flight in high-crime areas compared to non-high-crime areas. It delves into the complex interplay between law enforcement, citizens, and the boundaries of justice, raising critical questions about Fourth Amendment rights, police authority, and the impact of neighborhood classification on legal outcomes. Beyond the confines of the courtroom in C.E.L. v. State, the legal discourse surrounding unprovoked flight in Florida resonates deeply within the diverse neighborhoods of the state. The heart of the matter lies in the classification of neighborhoods as either high or low in crime.[ii] The court’s scrutiny of unprovoked flight in high-crime areas suggests a potential disparity in how legal standards apply across different communities.

As the case unfolds, it prompts a reflection on the implicit biases that might influence law enforcement actions and judicial decisions, particularly in areas historically marked by higher crime rates. In high-crime neighborhoods, the heightened scrutiny resulting from unscripted chases may breed mistrust and exacerbate already-existing tensions.[iii] This raises questions about the balance between maintaining public safety and fostering positive relationships between law enforcement and residents. One cannot overlook the potential racial and socioeconomic dimensions of unprovoked flight cases.[iv] As highlighted in C.E.L. v. State, individuals from ethnic minorities residing in economically disadvantaged areas may find themselves disproportionately subject to the legal consequences of fleeing from law enforcement.[v] While law enforcement is entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining order, the legal system must carefully navigate the boundaries to ensure that the rights of individuals are not unduly compromised, regardless of the neighborhood context.

In C.E.L. v. State, the defendant faced charges of obstructing or opposing an officer without violence after fleeing from law enforcement in a high-crime area. The court grappled with whether such flight, especially in neighborhoods characterized by elevated crime rates, constitutes a violation of section 843.02 of the Florida Statutes. This statute pertains to resisting, obstructing, or opposing a law enforcement officer without violence. Specifically, the case addresses the application of section 843.02 to a situation where an individual knowingly fails to heed a police order to stop, and the order is justified under the legal precedent set by Illinois v. Wardlow[vi], which allows investigatory stops based on unprovoked flight in a high-crime area. The decision sheds light on the legal nuances tied to the classification of an area as high-crime. In the context of unprovoked flight, the court emphasized the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois v. Wardlow but failed to analyze the effects that this decision will have on citizens in different areas of the state. The Florida case diverged from the precedent set by Wardlow, highlighting the legal intricacies of unprovoked flight in different neighborhood contexts. In deliberating, the court considered whether unprovoked flight alone could validate police action, particularly in areas not conventionally classified as high-crime. The court’s decision affirmed that knowing defiance of a lawful police order to stop, even after an initial flight, falls within the scope of section 843.02. This ruling applies irrespective of whether the initial justification for detention existed before the flight occurred.

The decision has significant ramifications for individuals residing in high-crime areas. It establishes a precedent that once law enforcement has a justification to stop an individual based on reasonable suspicion, failure to comply with a lawful order can lead to criminal charges under section 843.02. The case underscores the potential impact on racial and socioeconomic tensions in communities[vii], as individuals residing in such areas may be subject to heightened scrutiny and legal consequences.[viii] This means that simply being in an area supposedly classified as a “high-crime area”, such as Miami Gardens will have different legal implications and reactions from law enforcement to the same citizen residing in a relatively “safer” area such as Coral Gables. In a high-crime area like Miami Gardens, law enforcement may adopt a heightened level of vigilance and proactive measures due to the prevalence of criminal activities. Unprovoked flight may trigger a response informed by the neighborhood’s crime history, potentially leading to swift and assertive actions.[ix] Conversely, in a relatively safer area like Coral Gables, law enforcement may approach situations with a different mindset. While still attentive to potential threats, officers might be less inclined to view unprovoked flight as an immediate cause for suspicion, given the lower crime rates associated with the neighborhood.

This case calls for ongoing scrutiny and discussion, both within legal circles and the broader community to ensure a fair and equitable application of the law in diverse settings. In contemplating the trajectory of future cases involving unprovoked flight, it becomes imperative for the court to proactively address and mitigate the potential biased distinctions that may arise in the application of the law, such as actively involving communities in the development of policing strategies and educating the public on their rights.

[i] See C.E.L. v. State, 995 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (ruling that unprovoked flight in a high-crime area constitutes resisting an officer without violence; see also Fla. Stat. Ann. § 843.02 (pertaining to resisting, obstructing, or opposing a law enforcement officer without violence).

[ii] See Richard G. Wilkinson and Kate E. Pickett, The Enemy Between us: The Psychological and Social Costs of Inequality, Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 47, 11–24 (2017) (discussing inequality and its effects on social relations); see also Robin Smyton, How Racial Segregation and Policing Intersect in America, Tufts Now (June 17, 2020), https://now.tufts.edu/2020/06/17/how-racial-segregation-and-policing-intersect-america (exploring how historical patterns of racial segregation, often stemming from discriminatory practices, contribute to present-day disparities in policing).

[iii] See Nancy La Vigne, et al., How do People in High-Crime, Low-Income Communities View the Police?, Urb. Inst. (Feb. 2017), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/88476/how_do_people_in_high-crime_view_the_police.pdf (discussing public trust in law enforcement in lower income communities); see also Benoit De Courson and Daniel Nettle, Why do Inequality and Deprivation Produce High Crime and Low Trust?, Sci Reports (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-020-80897-8#citeas (discussing how societies that tend to have higher crime have lower social trust in the population around them).

[iv] See Anshu Sethi, et al., The Relationship Between Crime and Socioeconomic Status, Arcgis Storymaps (Dec. 1, 2020), https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/b5ab6df3741649c4bcc0a5fbd9e3b45b (discussing low socio-economic status and its relation to a higher crime rate); see also Randolph N. Stone, Crisis in the Criminal Justice System The Socio-Economic Struggle for Equality, 8 Harv. Blackletter J. 33 (1991) (discussing crises in law enforcement, the legal profession, and the criminal justice system).

[v] See Mia Carpiniello, Striking a Sincere Balance: A Reasonable Black Person Standard for “Location Plus Evasion” Terry Stops, 6 Mich. J. Race & L. 355 (2001) (discussing other reasons why people flee police in high-crime neighborhoods); see also David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. Rev. 265, 290–91 (1999) (discussing instances of racial profiling by police leading to unreasonable stops).

[vi] See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (dealing with constitutionality of a stop and frisk based on suspicious behavior in a high-crime area); see also Lacey McLaughlin, The Poverty-Crime Connection, Jackson Free Press (Oct. 19, 2011), https://www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2011/oct/19/the-poverty-crime-connection/ (discussing the connection between poverty and incarceration further dividing communities).

[vii] See Bennett L. Gershman, Use of Race in “Stop-and-Frisk”: Stereotypical Beliefs Linger, but How Far Can the Police Go?, N.Y. St. B.J., (Apr. 2000) at 42 (discussing stereotypical profiling of individuals in high crime neighborhoods); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (discussing justifiable fears of minority citizens “that contact with the police can itself be dangerous” even when the person is entirely innocent of any wrongdoing).

[viii] See Leslie Casimir, Minority Men: We Are Frisk Targets, N.Y. Daily News, (Mar. 26, 1999) (describing interviews with minority men where more than half of interviewees perceive the police as a controlling force and not protectors); see also Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Racial Profiling of African-American Males: Stopped, Searched, and Stripped of Constitutional Protection, 38 J. Marshall L. Rev. 439 (2004) (discussing racial profiling of black males by law enforcement).

[ix] See Rachel Kent and John Raphling, Interview: How Policing in One US City Hurts Black and Poor Communities, Hum. Rts. Watch (Sep. 12, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/12/interview-how-policing-one-us-city-hurts-black-and-poor-communities (discussing policing black communities leading to a cycle of poverty and arrests); see also Race, Trust and Police Legitimacy, Natl. Inst. of Just. (Jan. 9, 2013), https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/race-trust-and-police-legitimacy (showing that ethnic minorities are more likely to be singled out because of their race and/or ethnicity).