Minneapolis sits at the center of a growing constitutional tension between federal immigration enforcement and state criminal procedure following the shooting of Renee Good (“Good”). As local enforcement increasingly cooperates with federal immigration authorities, the line between civil immigration removal and criminal punishment has become blurred, raising concerns about the Fourth Amendment.[i] The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures taken by government actors.[ii] Specifically, the Fourth Amendment requires the use of deadly force by an officer to be “objectively reasonable” under the “totality of the circumstances” to prevent imminent death or serious bodily harm.[iii] Amongst the many issues following the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), a recent shooting involving federal immigration enforcement in Minneapolis has raised urgent questions about how constitutional protections operate when federal agents use lethal force within state borders.[iv]
In 2003, Congress enacted the Homeland Security Act, which established the Department of Homeland Security and consolidated immigration enforcement functions under what is now known as ICE.[v] Congress vested ICE with a distinctive blend of civil and criminal enforcement authority, designed to enhance national security and public safety. ICE’s primary mission, following the September 11 attacks, is to advance homeland security primarily through border control and immigration laws.[vi] This enforcement role increasingly operates at the intersection of civil regulation and criminal procedure. Section 1357 of the U. S. Code Title 8 (“Section 1357”) prescribes the powers of immigration officers and employees.[vii] The statute grants immigration officers unusually broad warrantless powers–ranging from interrogation to arrest and search–conditioned largely on discretionary assessments of immigration status and risk of flight.[viii]
Codified under Section 1357, ICE’s 287(g) Program (“the Program”) allows state and local police to perform some immigration enforcement functions under federal oversight.[ix] President Donald Trump’s Executive Order “Protecting the American People Against Invasion” expressly directs the Department of Homeland Security to expand the use of Section 287(g) “to the maximum extent permitted by law.”[x] This language is significant because partnerships between federal and state law enforcement typically require ICE approval, but expanding as a matter of executive policy removes hesitation at the federal level and signals to state law enforcement that cooperation is prioritized. Minneapolis, along with many other states, is actively participating in the Program, increasing the number of law enforcement officers to carry out arrests and deportations.[xi]
By multiplying the number of officers authorized to engage in immigration enforcement, Section 287(g) partnerships increase the frequency with which Fourth Amendment seizures occur in contexts traditionally insulated from criminal procedure scrutiny. The fatal shooting of Good illustrates the danger of this expansion, as the exercise of immigration enforcement authority through armed law enforcement encounters can undermine constitutional limits on the use of deadly force. The shooting is constitutionally analyzed under the Supreme Court case Graham v. Connor because the individual was (1) seized by government actors, (2) the seizure involved force, (3) this force being deadly, and (4) the officers were performing law enforcement functions.[xii] Immigration enforcement actions, whether carried out directly by ICE or state actors acting under the Program, involve physical restraints of liberty, constituting a seizure. When these encounters escalate to the use of deadly force, the Supreme Court requires courts to assess whether it was objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.[xiii]
While the Fourth Amendment sets the federal standard, individual states can pass statutes or have policies that add specific requirements, but these must meet the constitutional baseline. Minneapolis Code includes circumstances where law enforcement homicide is justifiable.[xiv] Specifically, the code requires deadly force only when necessary in defense of human life or to prevent great bodily harm.[xv] Additionally, the statute defines “deadly force” to include the intentional discharge of a firearm in the direction of another person or at a vehicle where a person is believed to be, and conditions its justification on an objectively reasonable belief that such force is necessary to avert imminent serious harm.[xvi] Here, the killing of the Minneapolis citizen would only be valid under state and federal law if the fleeing “felon” poses a danger, not merely because they are fleeing or a felon. Some argue that the officer faced an imminent threat of being struck by Good’s vehicle, while others contend that the use of deadly force was disproportionate because the officer had a clear path to safety.
The Supreme Court has made clear that flight alone cannot justify lethal force. Under Tennessee v. Garner, deadly force is reasonable only where an officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses an immediate threat of serious physical harm.[xvii] The Minneapolis shooting thus presents a critical question: whether immigration enforcement, often based on civil violations and uncertain criminal status, can satisfy the constitutional prerequisites for deadly force at all. As the number of officers enforcing immigration laws continue to expand, determinations regarding deadly force risk shifting away from the Fourth Amendment’s imminent-threat and proportionality framework toward reliance on immigration suspicion. Without heightened judicial scrutiny on cases such as the shooting of Good, and clear constitutional mechanisms for accountability, ICE partnership programs threaten to transform immigration enforcement into a space where constitutional protections exist in theory but erode in practice.
[i] U.S. Const. amend. IV.
[ii] Id.
[iii] Id.
[iv] See Elise Catrion Gregg, Mississippians Responds to ICE Agent’s Fatal Shooting of Minneapolis Woman, MPB News (Jan. 12, 2026), https://www.mpbonline.org/blogs/news/mississippians-respond-to-ice-agents-fatal-shooting-of-minneapolis-woman/ [https://perma.cc/8SFE-ZX7R] (explaining the sequence of events that lead to a fatal shooting by an officer).
[v] See History of ICE, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Dec. 19, 2025), https://www.ice.gov/history [https://perma.cc/E6AZ-Q49J] (explaining the creation of the Department of Defense and ICE).
[vi] Id. (expressing the original goals of ICE to protect national security).
[vii] 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2025).
[viii] 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (a)(1)-(5) (2025).
[ix] 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2025).
[x] 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2025); see also Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Jan. 14, 2026), https://www.ice.gov/identify-and-arrest/287g [https://perma.cc/KW6Q-N7RH] (explaining President Trump’s influence through his executive order authorizing state law enforcement to seek out officers).
[xi] See Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, supra note x (highlighting the various states, including Minneapolis, that have implemented or are in the process of implementing the program).
[xii] See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (describing the factors used in determining the standard to apply to government acts).
[xiii] See id. at 396.
[xiv] Minn. Stat. § 609.066 (2)(a)-(b) (2025).
[xv] Id.
[xvi] Id.
[xvii] See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (holding that deadly force may not be used against a fleeing suspect absent probable cause that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical harm).
