What happens when exclusivity is not a barrier but the very essence of what makes something luxurious? Scarcity has long been the driving force behind the prestige and value of the luxury market.[i] Rolex makes you wait for a Daytona, Ferrari chooses who may own its limited releases, and Hermès treats the Birkin as a ritual of status and belonging.[ii] These practices do more than sell products. They create desire, protect brand identity, and preserve the meaning of luxury itself. Without this careful balance, luxury would lose the very quality that sets it apart from mass consumer goods.
Hermès has built its brand empire on this principle, with the Birkin bag serving as the crown jewel of exclusivity. In 2024, consumers challenged that very principle in Cavalleri v. Hermès International, a class action alleging that Hermès tied access to Birkin bags to purchases of other Hermès products.[iii] According to the plaintiffs, Hermès sales associates pressured customers to build “purchase histories” by buying scarves, belts, jewelry, and home goods before being considered for a Birkin.[iv] They claimed this practice violated section 2 of the Sherman Act, California’s Cartwright Act, and state unfair competition law.[v]
On September 17, 2025, Judge James Donato dismissed the case with prejudice, ruling that the plaintiffs failed to define a relevant market, show Hermès had market power, or establish harm to competition.[vi] Under the Sherman Act, these elements are central because the statute targets conduct that restrains trade or creates monopolies that harm the competitive process, not practices that simply limit access or reflect selective marketing.[vii] In line with this principle, the court emphasized that antitrust law protects competition, not consumers’ preferences.[viii] Frustration at being unable to buy a Birkin or feeling compelled to spend thousands on ancillary goods was not enough. This outcome reaffirms that luxury markets are not bound by the same rules as commodities.[ix] Exclusivity, at least for now, remains a valid strategy under American antitrust law.
The plaintiffs’ arguments were ambitious but doctrinally weak. They attempted to frame the Birkin as its own product market, but courts generally disfavor single-brand markets absent extraordinary circumstances.[x] The plaintiffs also failed to demonstrate Hermès’ monopoly power, relying instead on the cultural dominance of the Birkin.[xi] Finally, they did not prove harm to competition in the tied product markets; while consumers may have been encouraged to buy scarves or belts, there was no evidence that competitors in those markets were excluded or foreclosed.[xii] As a result, the complaint did not satisfy the elements of an unlawful tying claim.[xiii]
The Hermès decision illustrates a broader truth: Luxury markets are fundamentally different from ordinary markets. Unlike commodities, where competition revolves around price and availability, luxury thrives on narrative, identity, and controlled scarcity.[xiv] These practices might look coercive to outsiders, but they are deeply embedded in the norms of luxury markets.[xv] The promise of exclusivity is the product itself. Antitrust law, however, has been designed to evaluate harm through price, production, and exclusion of competitors, not in terms of status.[xvi] Courts are understandably reluctant to equate scarcity with anticompetitive conduct because doing so would risk undermining the very model that makes luxury distinct.[xvii]
Still, the dismissal of Cavalleri does not mean luxury brands enjoy blanket immunity. A future case could succeed if plaintiffs present stronger evidence in three critical areas. First, market definition will be crucial. If a plaintiff can show that luxury goods constitute a distinct product market, courts may be more receptive. Unlike everyday handbags or shoes, luxury goods are sold less on function and more on scarcity, brand story, and prestige.[xviii] A consumer choosing between a Hermès Birkin and a Chanel Classic Flap would not view a Coach or Michael Kors bag as a realistic alternative. This lack of interchangeability supports a narrower luxury handbag market, one where exclusivity and craftsmanship, rather than price, drive consumer behavior. Demonstrating that consumers make purchasing decisions based on brand identity and scarcity, rather than utility, could satisfy the market-definition requirement that Cavalleri found lacking.
Second, market power must be demonstrated in economic rather than cultural terms. The Cavalleri court emphasized that “market share or position are not the same as market power,” and that a mere showing of dominance is insufficient without evidence of control over price or output.[xix] Plaintiffs must prove the defendant can coerce consumers or influence market conditions independently of competitors. In Wolf Concept v. Eber Bros., the court dismissed claims involving “ultra-premium” Petrossian Vodka because the plaintiff failed to show that the brand possessed economic power apart from its luxury image.[xx] Had Petrossian been able to raise prices or limit distribution while maintaining demand against rival vodka brands like Grey Goose or Belvedere, it would have demonstrated the type of market power necessary to sustain an antitrust claim. By contrast, cultural influence or brand desirability alone cannot establish the kind of economic control antitrust law requires; only evidence that consumers lack reasonable substitutes or that rivals are excluded can change the outcome.[xxi]
Third, harm to competition must be shown, not just harm to individual buyers. Both Cavalleri and Wolf Concept dismissed claims where plaintiffs alleged lost profits or reputational damage but failed to show a broader injury to market competition.[xxii] For instance, if conditioning Rolex watch allocations on jewelry purchases prevented independent jewelers from competing, or if Ferrari’s exclusivity agreements limited rival dealers, a court could view that as true antitrust injury.[xxiii] This distinction underscores that antitrust law targets market-wide exclusion, not consumer dissatisfaction or unequal access to luxury goods.
Ultimately, the dismissal of Cavalleri v. Hermès represents a victory for Hermès and for luxury brands. It reaffirms that exclusivity and scarcity remain legally valid strategies, insulated from antitrust liability absent strong proof of market foreclosure. Future claims may succeed with stronger pleadings and evidence, but this case highlights why courts remain cautious. If exclusivity were redefined as exploitation, it would destabilize the very foundation of luxury markets. Antitrust law is designed to protect competition, not to guarantee fairness in distribution or universal access to status goods. The distinction between consumer frustration and competitive harm must remain clear. Luxury is not meant to be universally accessible. It is meant to be rare, to stand apart from mass consumer goods, and to carry meaning precisely because not everyone can obtain it. The Sherman Act should not be stretched to dismantle exclusivity in a market where exclusivity is itself the product.[xxiv]
[i] See Jean-Noël Kapferer & Pierre Valette-Florence, Beyond Rarity: The Paths of Luxury Desire. How Luxury Brands Grow Yet Remain Desirable, 25 J. Prod. & Brand Mgmt. 120, 120 (2016).
[ii] See Powerfunk, The Rolex Waiting List Explained: 2025 Edition, Grey Market (May 13, 2025), https://www.luxurybazaar.com/grey-market/rolex-waitlist/ [https://perma.cc/W77N-9RZZ]; see also Daniele Lepido, Ferrari’s Push for More Exclusivity Is Helping the Bottom Line, Bloomberg (Jan. 31 2019, at 11:13 AM ET), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-31/ferrari-forecasts-2019-profit-will-rise-as-much-as-14 [https://perma.cc/3J7Y-EBZB].
[iii] Complaint at 2, Cavalleri v. Hermès Int’l, No. 3:24-cv-01707 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2024).
[iv] Complaint at 6, Cavalleri v. Hermès Int’l, No. 3:24-cv-01707 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2024).
[v] Complaint at 1, Cavalleri v. Hermès Int’l, No. 3:24-cv-01707 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2024).
[vi] Cavalleri v. Hermès Int’l, No. 24-cv-01707-JD, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182970, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 17, 2025).
[vii] See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2.
[viii] Cavalleri, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182970, at *8.
[ix] Id. at *2.
[x] Id. at *6.
[xi] Id.
[xii] Id.
[xiii] Id.
[xiv] See Xinyi Chen, Marketing Comparison Between Luxury Brands and Everyday Brands, 231 Int’l Conf. on Econ. Mgmt. & Cultural Indus. 236, 240–41 (2023).
[xv] See Jean-Noël Kapferer & Pierre Valette-Florence, Beyond Rarity: The Paths of Luxury Desire. How Luxury Brands Grow Yet Remain Desirable, 25 J. Prod. & Brand Mgmt. 120, 125 (2016) (“[F]ormer CEO of Ferrari North America, says ‘Luxury brands must select customers for the brands are what their customers are.’”).
[xvi] See Cavalleri, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182970, at *2; see also Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 585 U.S. 529, 542 (2018).
[xvii] Cavalleri, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182970, at *2.
[xviii] See Chen, supra note xiv.
[xix] Cavalleri, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182970, at *6.
[xx] Wolf Concept S.A.R.L. v. Eber Bros. Wine & Liquor Corp., 736 F. Supp. 2d 661, 668 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).
[xxi] See id. at 669.
[xxii] See id. at 669–70; see also Cavalleri, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182970, at *7.
[xxiii] See Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc., 675 F.3d 1192, 1199 (9th Cir. 2012).
[xxiv] See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (prohibiting only restraints of trade or monopolization that harm competition, not legitimate business models based on exclusivity); see also Cavalleri, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182970, at *8 (“Businesses may choose the manner in which they do business absent an injury to competition.”) (citation omitted).
