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    Florida’s Supermajority Rule: A Barrier to Change

    Grace Kendall
    By Grace Kendall

     

    In the 2024 election, multiple hot-button topics were on the ballot, namely Amendment 3, which would have legalized recreational marijuana for adults over twenty-one, and Amendment 4, which would have provided constitutional protection for access to reproductive healthcare by means of abortion. Both received over 55% approval by vote. Had these Amendments been up for vote in 47 of the other states, they would have passed.[i] In Florida, they could not.

    In 2006, Florida’s constitution was amended to require a supermajority of 60% for all future state constitutional amendments.[ii] Ironically, this amendment was passed with only 57.78% voter approval.[iii] Few other states require any more than a majority vote for constitutional amendments—Colorado requires 55%, New Hampshire requires 66.67%, and a few more count blank votes as “no.”[iv] Since the year 2000, 30 constitutional amendments throughout the states received more “yes” than “no” votes but still did not pass—13 of them were in the state of Florida.[v]

    Article 1, section 1 of Florida’s constitution states that “[a]ll political power is inherent in the people.”[vi] This sentiment did not feel true for many Floridians after the 2024 election results. Some voters were unaware of the 60% supermajority requirement for constitutional amendments.[vii] Seven out of the ten states that had abortion laws on the ballot in 2024 passed the amendments—Florida was not one of them.[viii] The supermajority requirement for constitutional amendments in Florida is a barrier to change, enabling as little as 41% of the minority to overshadow the desires of the majority.

    Alan Hays, supervisor of elections in Lake County, said Florida’s constitution should be a “guiding framework document that should not be changed just because of the whim of some group of people who all of a sudden [think] they can muster up a simple majority and go with it.”[ix] Can statements like this be reconciled with Article 1 of Florida’s Constitution, which vests the power in the people? Many think not.[x]

    When lawmakers proposed the supermajority requirement in 2006, their rationale was to raise the threshold necessary to make major changes without allowing frivolous amendments to “squeak by.”[xi] According to legal scholars, like University of Central Florida (“UCF”) political scientist Aubrey Jewet, “[t]he straw that broke the proverbial camel’s back was the pregnant pig amendment.”[xii] In 2002, animal rights groups proposed an amendment which would require that pregnant pigs be given enough room to turn around in their cages.[xiii] It passed with a simple majority.[xiv] Lawmakers cited this “pregnant pig law” as a reason why the supermajority requirement should be enacted, to prevent Florida’s constitution from “clutter.”[xv] Even supporters of the “pregnant pig” amendment were unsure of whether it “deserves to be in the Constitution.”[xvi]

    However, women’s rights  to access the same reproductive healthcare that is available in 21 other states and the District of Columbia should not be placed on a similar plane as the rights of pregnant pigs.[xvii] Recreational marijuana use—which is legal in 24 of the 50 states—is not comparable either.[xviii] Critics of the supermajority requirement feel that it curbs democracy under the guise of fighting “special interests.”[xix] Amendments 3 and 4 on the 2024 ballot were not niche special interests—they were the desires of the majority of Florida voters. The minority veto created by allowing 41% of voters to determine the outcome of every amendment on the ballot limits popular sovereignty.

    Now, to reverse the supermajority requirement and bring back the simple majority, more than 60% of Florida voters would need to vote in agreement—2.22% more than the votes that passed the supermajority requirement in the first place. Throughout the years, various politicians and special interest groups have attempted to gain traction and place this back on the ballot, but no luck. In 2023, a small group of politicians even attempted to push the requirement to 66.67% to make it even more difficult for new amendments to pass, but it did not make it past the House.[xx]

    Other states have tried to enact amendments which would require a supermajority for all future amendments. Voters in Ohio (2023), Arkansas (2022), and South Dakota (2022 & 2018 elections) all rejected these proposals.[xxi] It is easier to vote a supermajority requirement in than it is to vote it out. These numbers also make clear that far fewer states desire to impose supermajority amendment requirements. To date, none of the other states with supermajority requirements have been able to revert back to simply majority.[xxii] This has not stopped lawmakers from trying. In February 2025, Democratic Senator Carlos Guillermo Smith proposed a bill reverting Florida’s amendment process back to a simple majority.[xxiii] Unfortunately, after postponement in May, the bill “died” in the Ethics and Elections Committee in June 2025.[xxiv]

    In 2006, when Florida passed Amendment IX section 5,[xxv] the political landscape was different. Citizens and lawmakers alike were stunned that the pregnant pig amendment had made it through to the State Constitution. Today, the initiatives on the ballot have far higher stakes. A strong resurgence of opposition to Florida’s supermajority rule arose after the shocking results of the 2024 election. A reversion to simple majority should be placed back on the ballot in 2026. This would allow Florida citizens to decide the weight their votes will carry in future elections.

    [i] See Supermajority Requirements for Ballot Measures, BallotPedia,  https://ballotpedia.org/Supermajority_requirements_for_ballot_measures [https://perma.cc/SR8P-XMQL] (last visited Oct. 13, 2025).

    [ii] See Fla. Const. art. XI, § 5.

    [iii] See Florida Amendment 3, 60% Majority Requirement for Constitutional Amendments Amendment (2006), BallotPedia, https://ballotpedia.org/Florida_Amendment_3,_60%25_Majority_Requirement_for_Constitutional_Amendments_Amendment_(2006) [https://perma.cc/233R-8HBJ] (last visited Oct. 13, 2025).

    [iv] See BallotPedia, supra note i.

    [v] See List of State Ballot Measures that Failed Supermajority Requirement, BallotPedia, https://ballotpedia.org/List_of_state_ballot_measures_that_failed_supermajority_requirements [https://perma.cc/QC2J-4EQA] (last visited Oct. 13, 2025).

    [vi] Fla. Const. art. I, § 1.

    [vii] See Michael Hoffman, Why Does Florida Require 60% Vote to Pass Constitutional Amendments?, WPTV (Nov. 7, 2024), https://www.wptv.com/news/state/why-does-fla-require-a-vote-of-60-to-pass-constitutional-amendments [https://perma.cc/UZY5-C524].

    [viii] See Ballot Measures and Issues, AP News, https://apnews.com/projects/election-results-2024/ballot-measures/ [https://perma.cc/K82B-JSUL] (last visited Oct. 13, 2025).

    [ix] Mitch Perry, Florida Lawmakers Recall What Led to 60% Threshold to Pass Constitutional Amendments, Fla. Phoenix (Nov. 6, 2024, 6:20 PM), https://floridaphoenix.com/2024/11/06/fl-lawmakers-recall-what-led-to-60-threshold-to-pass-constitutional-amendments/ [https://perma.cc/J82R-A6XL].

    [x] Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 7, 29 (Fla. 2000) (Wells, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the proposed supermajority requirement for amendments prior to its enactment).

    [xi] See Hoffman, supra note vii.

    [xii] Marian Summerall, Four Florida Ballot Measures Got Over 50% But Still Didn’t Pass. Here’s Why, Cent. Fla. Pub. Media (Nov. 6, 2024), https://www.cfpublic.org/politics/2024-11-06/why-four-florida-constitutional-amendments-did-not-pass [https://perma.cc/QU2D-2Z3K].

    [xiii] See Perry, supra note ix.

    [xiv] See Perry, supra note ix; see also Fla. Const. art. X, § 21.

    [xv] See Perry, supra note ix.

    [xvi] See Summerall, supra note xii.

    [xvii] See After Roe Fell: Abortion Laws by State, Ctr. for Reprod. Rights, https://reproductiverights.org/maps/abortion-laws-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/EEB8-YJDG] (last visited Oct. 13, 2025).

    [xviii] See Marijuana Legality Map, DISA (Sep. 10, 2025), https://disa.com/marijuana-legality-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/UJZ5-XZNE].

    [xix] See generally Putting the Initiative Back Together, 138 Harv. L. Rev. 1911 (2025).

    [xx] See Jim Ash, Measure to Require Two-Thirds Majority to Amend Constitution Clears House Committee, The Fla. Bar (Feb. 15, 2023), https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-news/measure-to-require-two-thirds-majority-to-amend-constitution-clears-house-committee/ [https://perma.cc/R57Q-A69X].

    [xxi] See BallotPedia, supra note i; see also South Dakota Constitutional Amendment L, 60% Vote Requirement for Constitutional Amendments Measure (2026), BallotPedia, https://ballotpedia.org/South_Dakota_Constitutional_Amendment_L%2C_60%25_Vote_Requirement_for_Constitutional_Amendments_Measure_(2026) [https://perma.cc/K5B6-PWQX] (last visited Oct. 13, 2025).

    [xxii] See John Dinan, Constitutional Amendment Processes in the 50 States, State Ct. Rep. (July 24, 2023), https://statecourtreport.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/constitutional-amendment-processes-50-states [https://perma.cc/ST7H-CUUS].

    [xxiii] See Paola Tristan Aruda, Florida Lawmaker Proposes Lowering Threshold to Pass Constitutional Amendments, WESH (Feb. 20, 2025, 12:34 PM), https://www.wesh.com/article/florida-lawmaker-proposes-lowering-threshold-constitutional-amendments/63853966 [https://perma.cc/N4ZE-D2E2].

    [xxiv] See S. J. Res. 864, (Fla. 2025); see also Fla. Const. art. XI, § 5.

    [xxv] See Fla. Const. art. XI, § 5.

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